When the Restorer Needs Restoring: What to Do When Your Company Gets Hacked
By Taylor Carmichael and Doug Weatherman
Restorers are trained for emergencies. When the phone rings at 2:00 a.m. because a building is underwater, we know what to do. We stop the source, stabilize the environment, determine the extent of the damage, document what happened, prevent secondary damage, and begin recovery.
But what happens when the emergency is happening inside your own company?
Between the two of us, we have experienced and walked alongside restoration companies through very different cyberattacks. Different companies, different attacks, and different outcomes, but they had something important in common. Neither attack looked like an attack when it started.
The Email That Made Perfect Sense
A restoration company had just finished a quarterly meeting with a longtime marketing vendor. During the meeting, the company requested information and pricing for a new advertising campaign. About an hour later, the administrative team received an email from a known employee at that same vendor.
Everything about it made sense. The sender was familiar, the timing was right, and the request appeared connected to a legitimate business conversation that had taken place only an hour earlier. The email contained what appeared to be a legitimate DocuSign link, and when one employee opened it, the page asked them to authorize the Google account already active on the computer.
They did.
Then nothing happened. No document opened, no quote appeared, and there was no obvious indication that anything was wrong. Since it was the end of the day, the employee assumed there had been an error and that the vendor would straighten it out the following morning.
Unfortunately, the click had already given the attacker access.
Within hours, thousands of emails were sent from the compromised account to current and former customers, insurance carriers, vendors, suppliers, employees, industry contacts, and essentially everyone that employee had communicated with during the previous year. The attacker then deleted the sent email history, making it extremely difficult for the company to determine who had received the malicious message and warn them within those same conversations.
The attack did not stop with email. Software was downloaded that enabled screen sharing and recording, credentials were captured, and the computer's login information was changed. At one point during the investigation, the team could literally see the mouse moving across the infected computer while no one was touching it.
By approximately 2:00 a.m., people began contacting the employee to report suspicious emails coming from the account. The employee immediately began securing accounts and worked through the early morning before going into the office to continue the cleanup.
The restoration company suddenly had its own emergency.
Perhaps the most important part of the story is that the employee who clicked the link worked in technology. This was someone who understood cybersecurity, knew what phishing looked like, and knew better than to blindly click suspicious links. The problem was that this particular email was not suspicious in the traditional sense. It came from someone the company knew, immediately following a legitimate conversation, about something they were expecting to receive.
That is exactly what made it effective.
Another Attack Did Not Make Any Noise at All
At another restoration company, there was no suspicious DocuSign link and no computer suddenly behaving strangely. The attacker gained access to an employee's email account and simply waited.
They read conversations, learned who handled billing, and watched a completed restoration job move toward payment. When the timing was right, the attacker entered an existing email conversation with the customer using the same company identity, familiar context, and information that made the request appear legitimate. They provided updated payment instructions along with documentation designed to support the change.
The customer trusted the message and sent the payment.
The restoration company discovered the attack only when it followed up about the outstanding invoice and received a response no restoration company wants to read: "We already paid you."
The subsequent investigation found that the attacker had logged in from outside the country and created hidden mailbox rules that forwarded and deleted emails. There was no ransomware message, frozen computer, or dramatic warning that someone was inside the system. The attacker quietly used the company's own email account and an existing relationship to redirect the money.
These attacks looked completely different, but both exploited the same thing: trust.
When You Realize Someone Clicked, What Happens Next?
This is where restoration companies should recognize familiar territory. We would never arrive at a major water loss and begin randomly tearing things apart without first stopping the source, determining what was affected, documenting the conditions, and developing a plan. A cybersecurity incident deserves the same discipline.
Every company should have an incident response plan developed with its IT and cybersecurity partners before an incident occurs. The exact technical response will depend on your systems, security tools, and the nature of the attack, but employees should not have to figure out from scratch whom to call or what to do when they realize they clicked something malicious.
A simple framework can help teams remember the immediate priorities:
S.T.O.P. The Cyber Loss
S: Separate the affected device. If you believe a computer has been compromised, disconnect it from the network and stop using it. Do not continue clicking through windows, exploring what was installed, or trying to troubleshoot the problem yourself. If an attacker has remote access, continued activity can make the situation worse.
T: Tell your technology or security team immediately. Speed matters. Employees should know exactly whom to contact, including after hours. There should be no embarrassment associated with reporting a click. The faster your technology team knows what happened, the faster they can begin containing it.
O: Own and secure the affected accounts. Your technology team should determine which accounts or credentials may have been exposed and take the appropriate steps to secure them. Depending on the incident, that could include resetting credentials, revoking active sessions, reviewing multifactor authentication, checking forwarding or mailbox rules, examining recent sign-ins, and determining whether other systems were accessed. This portion should be handled with your IT or cybersecurity provider rather than improvised by the employee.
P: Protect everyone downstream. Once the immediate threat is contained, determine who else may have been affected. Did malicious emails leave the compromised account? Were customers, employees, carriers, vendors, or trade partners contacted? Was financial or sensitive information potentially exposed? Your technology, leadership, legal, insurance, and communications partners may all need to be involved depending on the severity of the incident. The goal is not simply getting the employee's computer working again. It is understanding the full radius of the loss.
Just as importantly, document the timeline. Record when the original message arrived, when the link was clicked, what credentials were entered or permissions granted, when unusual activity was first noticed, and what actions were taken afterward. In restoration, we understand the value of a good loss timeline. A cyber incident is no different.
Do Not Punish the Person Who Reports the Click
There is another lesson from these incidents that deserves just as much attention as the technology itself.
If your employees are afraid they will be embarrassed, disciplined, or publicly called out for clicking something malicious, they may hesitate before telling you. Those minutes or hours matter.
The first employee in our story could have hidden what happened. Instead, once the suspicious activity became apparent, the incident was reported and the response began. The infected computer was ultimately isolated, inspected, wiped, and restored. Other security and backup systems helped prevent significant data loss, but the company still spent days dealing with calls and emails from customers, industry friends, vendors, and others who had trusted the malicious email because it came from someone they knew.
The lesson should not be, "How could you click that?"
The better question is, "Why did this look trustworthy, and how do we make sure our people know what to do next time?"
Prevention Still Matters, But Assume Someone Will Eventually Click
Cybersecurity awareness training matters. Multifactor authentication matters. Email filtering matters. Endpoint protection, backups, conditional access, strong identity controls, and good technology partners all matter. In the previous incident, the restoration company learned the importance of controls such as multifactor authentication, blocking suspicious logins, stronger email security, and reinforcing a simple principle with employees: email is not identity.
But technology cannot eliminate human trust from business.
Restoration companies operate through relationships. We communicate constantly with adjusters, carriers, TPAs, agents, property managers, subcontractors, vendors, employees, and customers. We send links, invoices, estimates, documents, photographs, payment information, and files all day long. Cybercriminals understand that environment too.
That is why verification needs to become part of the culture. A familiar sender does not automatically make a request safe. An existing email thread does not prove the person responding is still the person you think it is. A request that perfectly matches something you are expecting can actually be what makes an attack convincing.
Cybersecurity Is Another Form of Restoration
There is some irony in restoration companies struggling with incident response because incident response is what we do for a living. We prepare for losses we hope never happen. We create emergency response plans, identify the source, stabilize the environment, determine the extent of the damage, prevent secondary damage, document what happened, communicate with the people affected, and work toward recovery. We should approach cybersecurity with the same mindset.
The question is no longer simply whether your company trains employees not to click malicious links. Eventually, someone may click one. The more important question is whether that employee knows exactly what to do in the next five minutes. Print the instructions. Put the emergency contact somewhere employees can access even if their computer is unavailable. Talk through the scenario during your next team meeting. Ask your IT provider what they want an employee to do first, and determine who needs to be notified and who has the authority to make decisions during an incident.
But our responsibility goes beyond protecting our own company. Restoration companies are entrusted with an incredible amount of information. Our systems can contain customer contact information, property details, insurance and claim information, photographs of homes and businesses, financial information, employee data, and years of communication with the people and organizations that trust us. Being given access to that information comes with a responsibility to be a good steward of it.
Cybersecurity is not simply an IT responsibility. It is part of protecting our customers, our employees, our business partners, and the organizations we have worked so hard to build. Just as we have a responsibility to protect a customer’s property while it is in our care, we have a responsibility to protect the information they have entrusted to us.
We will never eliminate every cyber risk, just as we cannot prevent every property loss. What we can do is prepare, build layers of protection, respond quickly when something happens, and create a culture where protecting data is treated with the same seriousness as protecting property.
Because when the click happens, that is not the time to start writing the emergency response plan. As restorers, we already understand what it means to be trusted with someone else’s property during one of their most vulnerable moments. In an increasingly digital industry, we must recognize that we have been entrusted with their data, too, and we have a responsibility to be good stewards of both theirs and our own.